一笑

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2014-7-28 21:30

好文分享：毛可能认为当代中国过于拜金—德国《明镜》周刊亨利基辛格访谈录(中英对照、全文翻译)

导读：三年前，德国《明镜》周刊采访了美国前国务卿基辛格，毫无疑问，谈的是中美关系、中国的现状、走向与历史，涉及面甚广，但整篇访谈录却用了“毛可能认为当代中国过于拜金”为标题，耐人寻味。基辛格对两国的了解确实比一般人深入，至少如下三方面，他的见解独特：


1. 中国人和美国人的思维方式迥然不同，美国人把外交问题当作一系列独立的问题，而中国人则认为所有外交问题是关联的。这类似于西医和中医的区别，西医头痛医头、脚痛医脚，中医则辩证施治。

2. 中国现在成了美国最大的债主，但是，中国想要动用自己的债主身份，就等于自杀。一句话——中国被美国套牢了。


3. 记者似乎很在意毛泽东如何看待中国，因而故意作为一个单独的问题提出来。而基辛格的回答却令记者大为惊讶。



为了方便读者阅读，本文将分九个部分连续上贴。翻译的不妥当的，敬请拍砖。

一笑

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2014-7-29 20:01

SPIEGEL Interview with Henry Kissinger: 'Mao Might Consider Modern China to Be Too Materialistic'
July 06, 2011 – 02:40 PM
《明镜》采访亨利基辛格：“毛可能认为当代中国过于拜金”
翻译：一笑
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-henry-kissinger-mao-might-consider-modern-china-to-be-too-materialistic-a-772292.html

For decades, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 88, has been a keen observer of China. He spoke with SPIEGEL about his encounters with Mao Tse-tung, the future of the Chinese Communist Party and the growing rivalry between Beijing and Washington.
几十年来，美国的前国务卿、88岁的亨利基辛格是一个深入的中国观察家。他对《明镜》说了他跟毛的几次会面，中Ｇ的未来，以及北京与华盛顿之间升级的竞赛。

SPIEGEL: Mr. Secretary, you have just celebrated your 88th birthday, meaning you are almost as old as one of the most influential political parties in world history -- the Communist Party of China (CPC), which turned 90 last week. Is it still accurate to call the CPC communist? Is China, the subject of your recent book, still communist?
明镜：国务卿先生，你刚过了88岁的生日，意味着你与世界史上最具影响力的政治团体之一——上周才满90岁(采访时间为2011年7月6日)的中G几乎同龄。现在把中G叫做GCD还准确吗？作为你的新书[*注]主题的中国，是否还是GCD？

[*译者注：基辛格的新书指2011年4月由Penguin Press出版的On China(《论中国》)。在amazon.com的售书网页上，一位评论者只给此书打了2分(总分5分)，让这位叫Mariusz Ozminkowski的评论者大为光火的是：”Kissinger is in awe of Mao Zedong”(基辛格敬畏毛泽东)，”The destructive and humiliating Cultural Revolution is actually presented in a positive light by Kissinger”(破坏性和侮辱人的文化革命实际上是被基辛格用正面光来呈现的)，”For him Mao is still the ‘philosopher king’” (对他来说毛依然是“哲学家之王”)。参见：http://www.amazon.com/On-China-Henry-Kissinger/dp/0143121316]

Kissinger: It is not a communist country in the way it was historically defined -- with state management of the economy, state determination of the distribution of income, total monopoly of every aspect of intellectual life. The reforms of Jiang Zemin in the early 2000s sought to broaden the base of the Communist Party by the doctrine of The Three Represents. But China remains a communist country in the sense that the Communist Party retains a monopoly of political power.
基辛格：这不是历史上定义的GCD国家——国家管理经济，国家决定收入分配，完全控制精神生活的各个方面。江ZM在21世纪早期的改革，寻求以“三代”教条来拓宽GCD的基础。但GCD仍然垄断政治权力，在此意义上，中国依然是一个GCD的国家。

SPIEGEL: Do you remember when you first perceived the CPC as an historical movement, perhaps even as an historical threat?
明镜：你是否记得，你何时第一次认识到中G是一次历史运动，甚至历史的威胁？

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2014-7-30 19:19

Kissinger: In the 1960s, I would have considered China with its CPC an ideologically more dynamic country than the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union was strategically more threatening.
基辛格：在20世纪60年代，我就认为中国及中G，是一个意识形态上比苏联更有活力的国家。但苏联是战略上更大的威胁。

SPIEGEL: And yet you and President Richard Nixon did not shy away from resuming diplomatic relations with China's communist leadership, starting in 1973.
明镜：而且从1973年开始，你和理查德尼克松总统并没有回避与中国的GCD领导人恢复外交关系。

Kissinger: Great Britain and France had established diplomatic relations years earlier. Our talks with Beijing served a clear strategic purpose: We thought that a China and Soviet Union that balanced each other were in the Western strategic interest. Also, we thought it was very important to demonstrate to the American public, at that time divided by the Vietnam War, a new notion of international peace.
基辛格：英国和法国几年前就与其建立了外交关系。我们与北京的对话有很清楚的战略意图：中国与苏联相互抗衡符合西方的战略利益。当年美国民众正被越战撕裂，我们也认为，向民众展现一个新的国际和平的构想，也是非常重要的。

SPIEGEL: When you met with the Chinese back then, did you realize the enormous human toll these leaders had inflicted on their own people -- the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward? Did that not bother you?
明镜：当时你见到那些中国人时，你意识到这些领导人带给他们自己的人民带来的巨大生命损失没有？如：文革、大跃进。那些没有让你不心安吗？

Kissinger: These events were a catastrophe.
基辛格：这些事件是灾难。

SPIEGEL: And well-documented at the time of your talks in China. The Great Leap Forward alone cost up to 45 million lives, according to the estimates of historians.
明镜：而且在你们会谈时已经清楚纪录在案。根据历史学家的估计，仅大跃进就以多达4千5百万生命为代价。

Kissinger: The suffering and starvation were known, but not in their full dimension. In any case, we dealt with China as a state; we did not endorse its moral direction. All of our European allies and Japan applauded this course.
基辛格：苦难和饥饿是知道的，但没有完全清楚。不管如何，我们把中国当作一个国家来相处，我们不为它的道德取向背书。所有欧洲盟国及日本都赞赏我们的进程。

SPIEGEL: Is it a choice you chose because your foreign policy considerations trumped moral ones?
明镜：这是否说明，你之所以作出这个选择，是你的外交政策考虑战胜了你的道德考虑？

一笑

Kissinger: No. Because we thought the promotion of peace was also a moral virtue, and because security was also an important objective. We would have thought that the alternative conclusion would have been not to have any contact with China.
基辛格：不。我们认为推进和平同样是道德高尚的，而且安全同样是一个重要的目标。我们应该考虑到，如果不跟中国进行任何接触，其后果是什么。

SPIEGEL: Do you believe the CPC will still be around in another 90 years?
明镜：你是否相信，再过90年中G还存在？

Kissinger: The party will have to broaden its base. There are many new forces in China, and the leaders of the current party are proclaiming that changes have to be made. The essential question, of course, is if the Chinese will in time permit the existence of alternative parties.
基辛格：它必须拓宽它基础。在中国有许多其他新的力量，它现在的领导人也宣称必须改变。当然基本的问题是，中国人是否及时允许其他党派的存在。

SPIEGEL: Does the CPC have an ideological core left, or is it now just a convenient power vehicle for the Chinese elites?
明镜：中G是否还留存下一个意识形态核心？或者这只是中国精英的一个便利的权力载体？

Kissinger: The party will develop in the direction of the PRI party (Institutional Revolutionary Party) that ruled Mexico for about seven decades by making pragmatic adjustments. There can be a core ideological component left which, however, will not play the comprehensive role it did in the Mao period.
基辛格：此党将沿着制度革命党的方向发展，如在墨西哥执政70年的党那样做出务实的调整。留下一个意识形态核心元素是可能的，但不能像在毛时代那样发挥广泛的作用。

SPIEGEL: The opening up of relations, which you initiated, has often been hailed as a foreign policy triumph. But it could be argued that it started a process which has now made America weaker and China stronger. The current US trade deficit with China is gigantic, and Beijing holds almost $900 billion in US bonds.
明镜：你所启动的开放关系通常被称赞为外交政策的胜利。但也有人说，这也启动了美国衰败、中国壮大的进程。现在美国与中国的贸易逆差巨大，北京拥有近9千亿美国的国债。

一笑

Kissinger: You can say that only if you did not live then as a conscious participant in the debate. When the relationship was started, the idea that China would become an economic competitor of the United States seemed unimaginable. But what was the alternative? If a country of one billion people organizes itself, it is bound to turn into a huge competitor. The fiscal imbalance is not caused by the opening but by unwise American policies.
基辛格：如果你不是一个清醒的争论参与者，你可以这么说。当双边关系开始时，中国将成为美国经济的竞争者这样的想法，是不可想象的。两国财政（贸易）不平衡，不是由开放引起的，而是由美国的失策引起的。

SPIEGEL: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once expressed her frustration with China by saying: "How do you deal toughly with your banker?"
明镜：美国国务卿希拉里克林顿曾表示她在面对中国时的挫败感，说：“对你的银行家，你如何强硬得起来？”

Kissinger: When you owe enough money to the banker, it becomes a mutual suicide arrangement. If the Chinese try to use their position as a banker, they can do it only at the risk of losing the exports that made them a principal banker in the first place.
基辛格：当你欠银行相当的钱，这便成了双向自杀的安排。如果中国人企图使用他们作为银行家的地位，他们就要冒失去出口的危险，首先是这出口使他们成为主要的银行家。

SPIEGEL: So you would be less worried about US debt to China than Clinton?
明镜：因此，你不像（希拉里）克林顿那样担心美国欠中国的债务？

Kissinger: It is difficult to judge degrees of worry. I don't believe that the banking relationship as such is unmanageable. It is, however, not feasible for the United States to run huge deficits indefinitely without endangering its general creditworthiness independent of what the Chinese do with debt they have.
基辛格：很难判断担忧的程都。我不相信，双方目前类似于银行往来的关系不可控制。当然，无视中国如何对待其拥有的美国债务（债权），美国都能够无限制地运营巨额逆差而不影响美国的总体信誉，也是不可行的。

SPIEGEL: Clinton was also critical of China's reaction to the Arab Spring. She said the Chinese are "scared" of it and trying to turn back history. How concerned is Beijing about the recent developments in the Middle East?
明镜：克林顿（希拉里）也批评中国对“阿拉伯之春”的反应。她说，中国害怕它而企图开历史倒车。北京对最近的中东局势有多担忧？

一笑

Kissinger: It is tactically and psychologically not wise to tell a country that has 4,000 years of uninterrupted history that we understand its history better than they do. But no doubt, the potential application of the principles of the Arab Spring to China is a matter of concern to the Chinese leadership.
基辛格：告诉一个有4000年不中断历史的国家，我们比他们自己更了解它的历史，从操作上到心理上都是不明智的。但“阿拉伯之春”的原理应用到中国的潜在可能性，对中国领导人来说，无疑是他们关注的一个问题。

SPIEGEL: What would happen if social protests were to erupt in China and there was a repeat of the Tiananmen Square massacre? How would the world react?
明镜：如果中国爆发社会抗议，T A M屠杀再现，会发生什么？世界将如何反应？

Kissinger: The American formal position has been that we oppose violence by governments against their people. That principle should not be abandoned. The implications of that in individual cases, though, have to be seen through the context of overall foreign policy.
基辛格：美国的官方立场一直是反对政府对人民采取暴力。原则不能抛弃，虽然各个独立事件必须放在外交政策的全局来检视。

SPIEGEL: That leaves a lot of wiggle room.
明镜：这就留出很大的伸缩空间了。

Kissinger: For those human rights issues that we consider of fundamental importance, we have to stand up, but then we also have to understand that a foreign policy price is to be paid for that attitude.
基辛格：对那些被认为根本上重要的人权问题，我们不得不站起来，但是也必须明白，我也要为此付出外交代价。

SPIEGEL: You seem to prefer dealing with human rights issues behind closed doors, rather than in public.
明镜：你似乎宁愿关门处理人权问题，而不是公开处理。

Kissinger: I have always said that with respect to China, engagement is preferable.
基辛格：关于中国，我常说保持关系应是首选的。

SPIEGEL: But when China is angry with another country or, for example, with the Nobel Prize Committee for giving an award to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, they say so, loud and clear. That is a double standard -- why shouldn't the West criticize Beijing in public?
明镜：但是，当中国对其他国家或组织发火的时候，比如对诺贝尔奖委员会把奖颁给持不同政见者刘晓波，他们说了出来，大声地、清楚地。那是双重标注——为什么西方不能公开地批评中国？

一笑

Kissinger: I do not criticize people who take a public stand on human rights issues. I express my respect for them. But some people are more influential without a public confrontation.
基辛格：我没有批评那些对人权问题采取公开立场的人。我表示对他们的敬重。但是有的人不搞公开对抗却更有影响力。

SPIEGEL: When President Barack Obama took office, he tried to reach out to China. But lately the Chinese-American debate has focused on controversies -- arguments at the World Climate Conference in Copenhagen, fierce debates about the Chinese exchange rate or the coolreception Obama received during his visit to China.
明镜：当巴拉克奥巴马履行总统职责后，他试图跟中国搭上关系，但是后来中美之间的分歧就变成了争吵——在哥本哈根的世界气象大会上的争吵，关于中国汇率的激烈争论，以及奥巴马访华时遭到冷遇。

Kissinger: Obama would like to improve relations with China. China also wants to improve relations with the United States. What is not happening is finding a grammar for the dialogue, and part of this is a cultural problem. The Americans look at foreign policy as a seriesof pragmatic issues, partly because every problem that has been recognized as a problem in America has been soluble. So, we deal with the Chinese on a series of specific issues.
明镜：其实奥巴马很愿意改善跟中国的关系。中国也想改善跟美国的关系。只是双方没有找到合适的对话方式，而出现这种情况，部分原因是文化的问题。美国人把外交政策当作一系列务实的（独立）问题，部分原因是，美国已经意识到的每一个（独立）问题，都是可以得到解决。因此，我们把中国人当作一系列特定的（独立）问题来解决。

SPIEGEL: And it's different for the Chinese?
明镜：而这是与中国人不同的？

Kissinger: The Chinese look at foreign policy as an interrelated series of events. Take the debate about the Chinese exchange rate: We talk about the narrow issue if the Chinese currency has to appreciate. Chinese look at it in terms of the overall economic relationship with the US.
基辛格：中国人把外交政策看作一系列相互关联的事件。以关于中国汇率的争吵为例：我们谈论的是一个狭隘的问题，即中国货币是否必须升值。而中国人则把这个问题放到中美整体经济关系上来对待。

SPIEGEL: And they would only adjust their currency rate if the Americans were willing to reciprocate?
明镜：而他们只有在美国愿意给予回报的情况下才调整汇率？

一笑

Kissinger: Exactly. There has to be some American adjustment in some other area of significance to the Chinese.
基辛格：完全如此。美国必须在其他对中国人重要的领域做出调整。

SPIEGEL: So are the Chinese thinking more strategically in terms of foreign policy?
明镜：这么说，中国人的外交政策思维更策略？

Kissinger: No, just more comprehensively.
基辛格：不，只是更综合。

SPIEGEL: Do the Chinese currently feel they are finally returning to former glories?
明镜：中国人现在觉得他们恢复以往的荣耀了吗？

Kissinger: The Chinese are often described as a "rising power." But they do not think of themselves as a rising power because, for 18 of the last 20 centuries, their GDP was the largest in the world. They perceive the past century and a half as an aberration and humiliation.
基辛格：中国常被说成“崛起的大国”。但是，他们自己并没有认为他们是崛起的大国，因为过去的20个世纪里有18个世纪，他们的GDP（国民生产总值）是世界上最大的。他们把过去的一个半世当作失常与羞辱。

SPIEGEL: You are describing the mindset of Chinese leadership in great detail, but having visited China more than 70 times, have you ever met ordinary Chinese?
明镜：你及其详细地描述中国领导人的思维方式，你访问中国70多次，可你见过普通中国人吗？

Kissinger: I don't know what you mean by "ordinary Chinese." On most visits, I do what I also do in Germany, which is to meet a cross section of intellectuals and people I can reach.
基辛格：我不明白你所谓的“普通中国人”是什么意思。在我的大部分访问期间，我所做的就跟在德国访问一样，见到一些代表性的知识分子以及我能接触到的其他人。

SPIEGEL: You met dictator Mao Zedong several times in the 1970s. What would he think of modern China?
明镜：在1970年代，你见到了独裁者毛泽东好多次。他会如何看待当代中国？

一笑

Kissinger: Mao was interested in his notion of the ideological purification of China more than in an economic recovery of China. In our conversations, he showed next to no interest in economic cooperation with the West. So he might consider current China to be too materialistic. He would probably not like the modern "yuppies" in Beijing or Shanghai.
基辛格：比起中国的经济复兴，毛更感兴趣的，是他关于中国意识形态纯洁性的理念。在我们的谈话中，他几乎对与西方进行经济合作没有兴趣。因此，他也许认为当代中国太过拜金。他可能不喜欢北京或上海的现代“雅皮士”（大把挣钱、大把花钱的年轻人——编者）。

SPIEGEL: "Purity" -- is thatreally the ideal you associate with Mao?
明镜：“纯洁性”——这真的是你将其与毛联系起来的理想吗？（译者注：剑桥英语辞典对Ideal的解释：a principle or a way of behaving that is of a very high standard-标准极高的原则或行为方式。）


Kissinger: Mao's definition of purity was based on different premises than the West's. He inflicted monstrous sufferingon the Chinese people. But I am just pointing out that the Chinese attitude is more complex. They appreciate that he united the Chinese people.
基辛格：毛对纯洁性的定义所依据的前提是与西方不同的。他给中国人民带来巨大的苦难。但是，我只是指出，中国人的态度更为复杂。他们感激他将中国人民团结起来。

SPIEGEL: Are the Chinese beginning to think that perhaps Mao was onto something?
明镜：中国人是否开始认为，也许当年毛即将有某种重要的发现？

Kissinger: The generation of China's former leader Deng Xiaoping (who ruled in the 1980s and 1990s) considered the Cultural Revolution an unmitigated disaster. I believe it to be a huge disaster, too. But there are now people in China who look at the policies launched by Mao as something that might have had some significance, even as it went too far.
基辛格：中国前领导人邓小平（1980年代到1990年代在位）那一代人认为，文化革命是一场十足的灾难，我也相信这是一场巨大的灾难。但是，现在中国有人认为毛所推行的政策可能具有某些重大意义，就算[注1]这[注2]有些过头了。


[译者注1：这里，基辛格特意用”even as”来引导后面的从句，字典对”even as”的解释是：”at the same time as”，含义跟even if有明显的区别，需要细心体会。有人以为这里用even as 错了，情有可原。有人直接把even as 当作even if 译作“即使”，就太浅薄了。]


[译者注2：原文这里用”it”来指代本句的”something”。有人以为用”it”是错误，应该用”they”。这属于粗心。有人以为这个”it”是指两句前的”the Cultural Revolution”，这就是笑话了。]




（未完，待续）

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SPIEGEL: American businesses that invest in China complain about massive copyright violations. US officials lament so-called "new Chinese colonialism" in Africa. How do you address these issues, given the Chinese sensitivities you described?
明镜：美国投资到中国的企业抱怨，中国广泛侵犯版权。美国官员感叹在非洲的所谓“新中国殖民主义”。考虑到你描述的中国人的敏感性，你对中国的这些问题如何评论？

Kissinger: On issues that affect the national interest immediately, you defend it. That is normal when you talk about the impact of a nation across its borders. My view is that in the relationship with China, our interests are better served by creating a sense of co-evolution than by constant confrontation.
基辛格：对直接影响到国家利益的问题，你就捍卫它。当你谈论一个国家越过它的边界时，这是正常的。在与中国的关系上，我的观点是，创造某种意义上的共同进步，比经常性对抗更能保护我们的利益。

SPIEGEL: When China becomes involved in other countries, they seem to only be concerned with business interests or natural resources. Unlike America, Beijing has not yet developed ideological missionary tendencies.
明镜：当中国卷入其他国家时，他们似乎只关心商业利益或者自然资源。不像美国，北京尚未发展起意识形态使命的趋势。

Kissinger: Americans believe that you can alter people by conversion, and that everybody in the world is a potential American. The Chinese also believe that their values are universal, but they do not believe that you can convert to becoming a Chinese unless you are born into it.
基辛格：美国人相信，通过对话你能改变人，世界上的每一个人都是一个潜在的美国人。中国人也相信他们的价值是具普遍性的，但是他们不相信你能转化成一个中国人，除非你生来就是中国人。

SPIEGEL: Will your book be published in China?
明镜：你的书会在中国出版吗？

Kissinger: I don't know yet. I will not accept abridgments, so it will be interesting to see if it happens or not.
基辛格：我还不知道。我不接受删节，因此，看着这事能否发生也很有趣。

SPIEGEL: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for this conversation.
明镜：国务卿先生，非常感谢你的这次谈话。

(Interview conducted by Gregor Peter Schmitz and Bernhard Zand.)

一笑

1、西方人基辛格崇拜毛泽东，毋容置疑。但他毕竟是西方人，他的话必须用西方的陈词滥调来包装，才能获得西方人的认可。正因为此，基辛格赞赏毛泽东更难能可贵。

2、基辛格透露：美国人相信，世界上任何一个人都是一个潜在的美国人。这对于那些热爱美国的中国人来说，绝对是个好消息！恭喜恭喜！

3、有人以为吃了几年洋人的口水，其英文水平就会比别人高明，其实也不过如此，还平添了一段笑话（见9#楼的译者注1、2）。嘻嘻。